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Abstract. Diagnosis and, when possible, prognosis of faults are essential
for safe and reliable operation. The area of fault diagnosis has emerged
over three decades. The majority of studies are related to linear sys-
tems but real-life systems are complex and nonlinear. The development
of methodologies coping with complex and nonlinear systems have ma-
tured and even though there are many unsolved problems, methodology
and associated tools have become available in the form of theory and
software for design. Genuine industrial cases have also become available.
Analysis of system topology, referred to as structural analysis, has proven
to be unique and simple in use and a recent extension to active structural
techniques have made fault isolation possible in a wide range of systems.
Following residual generation using these topology-based methods, de-
terministic and statistical change detection has proven very useful for
online prognosis and diagnosis. For complex systems, results from non-
Gaussian detection theory have been employed with convincing results.
The chapter presents the theoretical foundation for design methodologies
that now appear as enabling technology for a new area of design of sys-
tems that are reliable in practise. Yet they are also aordable due to the
use of fault-tolerant philosophies and tools that make engineering eorts
minimal for their implementation. The chapter includes examples for an
autonomous aircraft and a baling system for agriculture to illustrate the
generic design procedures and real life results.
Keywords: Fault diagnosis, Fault-tolerant Control, Change Detection,
Complex Systems
1 Introduction
Diagnosis of faults and active accommodation of faults are tools to prevent that
faults develop into failure. Diagnosis is needed for fault-tolerant control where
the diagnostic information is used without operator intervention to handle a
fault or it is used by a human supervisor in support for fault-tolerant operation.
The theory of fault diagnosis has a long history. Early papers that helped the
directions in this eld included seminal results on generation of residuals using
parity space approaches [20], combined overview and research articles [40], [52],
[40], [41], [55]. Early applications appeared in [79] for diagnosis of ight control
systems, in [27] for chemical processes, in [54]. The theory for fault-diagnostic
observers was pioneered in [32], [33], and generation of robust residuals in [35],
[18]. Extension to fault-tolerant control emerged in [7], [9], [100] and theories for
integration of diagnosis and control for linear systems appeared [73]. Diagnosis
for nonlinear systems using geometric theory was pursued in [81]. Robust meth-
ods matured [59], [92] and [85], also for Fuzzy and neural network approaches
[61], [78]. The crucial issue of threshold selection for diagnosis was treated in
papers by [29] for the uncertain deterministic case and for the stochastic case
by [3]. Extension to discrete event and quantised systems appeared in [70] and
[69]. Early edited books helped develop the area [80], and several textbooks now
show the maturity of the area [101], [2], [42], [72], [19], [47], [5], [71], [62], [56],
[21], [76], [22].
The above methods rely mostly on detailed mathematical models of the plant.
When complex systems are in focus, detailed models are very dicult or at least
very expensive to obtain, and a dierent approach has become widely appreci-
ated. This is based on graph-analysis of system properties and this is the subject
of this chapter. The graph-based techniques do not replace the above analytical
methods but for complex systems they have proven to be very attractive. Several
aspects of control and diagnosis of complex systems appeared in [1]. Applications
are plenty and to mention a few from recent years, omitting many important
contributions: [8], [65], [46], [84], [93], [44], [13], [17].
Coping with complex systems is a challenge. Dimensionality of the problems
met in real life is one challenge, complexity and nonlinearity are others. The
ideas of using graph-analysis concepts to help solving complex set of equations
were studied early in the applied mathematics community with the result of [25]
being instrumental for the area. Further theoretical developments in [26] and [51]
made the analysis of the structure of a set of equations or of a system described
by such equations a feasible task, even for large systems of nonlinear equations.
Structural analysis as this area is called, has been used intensively in Chemical
Engineering for solving large sets of equations and issues on solvability have been
pursued in a number of publications, see [96] and [68] and the references herein.
The structural approach and the features it oers for analysing monitoring and
diagnosis problems was rst introduced in [89] and further developed in [88].
Extensions to analysis of recongurability and fault-tolerance emerged in [87]
and [90]. The structural analysis approach was brought into a digested form in
[5], [95]. Structural analysis has hence evolved during several decades. However,
the salient features of the theory and the possibilities it oers have only become
apparent to a larger community in the eld of automation and automatic control
over the last few years. Reasons for the slow penetration into applications origin
mainly in the lack of widely available tools to support the structural analysis
method for automated industrial systems. Software tools appeared in [23] and
in [6]. An approach to highly ecient algorithms was developed in [63].
When considering diagnosis for control, the safety, from a structural point
of view, depends on services oered by a system not only in normal operation
but more important, after reconguration of the system to accommodate one
or more faults. [11] considered the safety of fault-tolerant control schemes when
multiple faults could be present. It was shown how structural analysis could be
applied to analyse cases of multiple faults and to synthesise residual generators.
Fault isolation, which is instrumental for correct fault handling, was addressed
and active isolation was introduced from a structural point of view.
This chapter revisits the theory for graph-based analysis of systems, intro-
duces the notion of structural active isolability. It rst reviews the concept of
behaviours and shows how the behaviour of a system is equally well applied on
the services oered by hardware and software components. It then interprets the
impact on safety of a system that is supposed to work under conditions of mul-
tiple faults. While it is well established that structural analysis is very useful for
residual generation of technical processes [24], it is less obvious that the generic
technique is also very applicable on complex system, even generation of residuals
for diagnosis in a natural environment. The combination with change detection
techniques is highlighted, and the techniques needed for nonlinear systems, when
non-Gaussian residuals occur, are demonstrated. Two real cases are included for
illustration of the complete design procedure, an aeroplane speed sensor fault
diagnosis problem and a case of baler control for agriculture. The latter includes
vision sensor techniques and results show how the diagnostic concepts can also
be applied to enhance the robustness of a vision-based control system.
2 Graph-based Analysis
Fault-tolerant control uses control or sensor reconguration to accommodate
failures in instruments, plant components or actuators. Aiming at utilising ex-
isting redundancy in instrumentation and control devices as far as possible,
fault-tolerant control can be applied to minimise the hazards associated with
malfunction, even when several sensors or actuators fail, but several modica-
tions need be made to the usual single fault FTC schemes in order to achieve
the necessary level of safety.
2.1 Recongurability and safety
The topology (structure) approach that is pursued in this context considers a
system as consisting of a set of components which each oer a service and per-
forms this service through dened normal behaviours. A component can oer
dierent versions of services and command to the component can dene which
version of a service is made available. Within a component, fault-tolerant tech-
niques can use fault-diagnosis and fault-handling to switch between services or
oer a service in a version with degraded performance if local malfunction should
make this necessary.
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Fig. 1. Three architectures, single line with no redundancy (1), hardware redundancy
(2) and combined fault-tolerance and redundancy (3)
2.2 Subsystem services
A system breakdown in Fig.1 shows three dierent topologies, by which we mean
the arrangement of the system components and their interaction. Component k
has input uk , output yk; parameters k and a behaviour ck(yk; uk; k) = 0:
The behaviour may be constructed from a set of constraints fck1; ck2; :::; ckng
associated with the subsystem and the exterior behaviour of the component is
the union of internal behaviours ck = ck1 [ ck2 [ :::: [ ckn or for brevity, ck =
fck1; ck1; :::; ckng. Following the generic component denition in [5], the service
S(k) oered by component k is to deliver produced variables (output), based on
consumed variables (input) and available resources, according to the specied
behaviour S
(k)
(v) where v 2 f1; 2; 3; ::g is the version of the service. Clearly, the
exterior behaviour is associated with the service oered by the component, we
denote this behaviour by c
(v)
k :
In this context we particularly wish to consider versions of the same service
that follow from the condition of the component, from normal over degraded
to none. If a component has an internal failure, fault-tolerant techniques may
still provide a version of the service with degraded performance

S
(k)
(d)

or the
service may not be available at all

S
(k)
(o)

. Hence, we consider the set of versions
v 2 fn; d1; d2; ::; og where n : normal; d1 : degraded1; d2 : degraded2; o : none.
2.3 Service at system level
The service obtained by the system as an entirety is a function of the component
architecture A and the versions for the present condition ki of components. With
m components in a system, each component in one out of p conditions, ki 2 Npi ;
we have a versions vector v = [v1(k1); v2(k2); :::; vm(km)], and the set of available
behaviours Cv =
n
c
v(k1)
1 ; c
v(k2)
2 ; :::; c
v(km)
m
o
.
Denition 1 (Overall Service) The overall service available from a system
is S(s)(c
v(ki)
i ) = A(Cvjv(k)); i = 1; :::;m.
With a single string architecture from Fig. 1, we obtain
S(s) = S(1) \ S(2) \ S(3) (1)
With redundancy in the system, the hardware conguration with two parallel,
totally redundant lines with only one component in common,
S(s) = S(1) \

S(2a) \ S(3a)

[

S(2b) \ S(3b)

(2)
This solution is expensive as it requires two completely redundant subsys-
tems. A cost eective solution would be to have some components intrinsically
safe S(1), have others equipped with fault-tolerant properties so their service
S
(2)
v(2) will be available but in degraded version when local faults occur, and just
have hardware redundancy for few essential components (3a; 3b). The fault tol-
erant architecture shown in part C of Fig. 1 is based on this idea. The service
at system level is
S(s) = S(1) \ S(2)v(2) \

S(3a) [ S(3b)

(3)
The paradigm in this architecture is that component failures should be de-
tectable and control be switched to obtain a fault-tolerant service or recongure
the system bypassing faulty components. This should be achieved by controlling
the signal ow in the software of the system.
2.4 Availability and safety
The plant at the system level is available as long as the predened normal service
is oered in some version, normal or degraded. A fault-tolerant version of the
service is obtained when one or more of the component services are oered in a
fault-tolerant version. A fail-operational version of the service is obtained when
hardware reconguration has been made to bypass a failure in the redundant
component.
When multiple local failures are present, the service at system level is
S(s) = A (Cvjv)
Denition 2 (Availability) A system is available when S(s)  S where
S =
n
S
(s)
1 ; S
(s)
2 ; :::; S
(s)
n
o
is the set of admissible services that meet specied over-
all objectives for behaviour O of the system:
8S(s)i (cv(ki)i ) : Cv  O:
Denition 3 (Structural fault) Fault. A fault in the structural description of
behaviours is a deviation from normal behaviour,
9i : ci 6= 0:
Denition 4 (Critical fault) A fault in ci is critical ci 2 Ccrit if it will cause
the system's behaviour to be outside the set of admissible behaviours,
ci 2 Ccrit iff ci 6= 0) Cv " O:
Denition 5 (Useability) Useability for reconguration. A faulty system is
usable for reconguration, from the structure point of view, if all critical faults
are structurally detectable,
8ci 2 Ccrit : ci 2 Cdetectable
Assumption 1 (Intrinsical safety) It is a natural assumption that shut-down
of the system is intrinsically safe and that the system can be shut down to a safe
mode from any condition where S(s)  S.
Denition 6 (Structural recongurability) A system is structurally recon-
gurable if
ci 6= 0) 9j 6= i;v(j) 6= v(i) : Cv(j)  O
The task of fault-tolerant control is to nd an appropriate v(j) when the
fault ci is detected and isolated and bring the system from version v(i) to v(j).
Having dened the system properties in terms of behaviours, it is natural to
employ structural analysis where behaviours are dened in terms of constraints
between variables and graph theory methods oer rapid and rigorous analysis.
2.5 Structure graph
A structural model of a system can be represented as a bipartite graph that
connects constraints and variables. The structure graph [89] of a system (C;Z)
is a bipartite graph G = (C;Z;E) with two set of vertices whose set of edges
E  C  Z is dened by (ci; zi) 2 E i the variable zi appears in constraint ci:
The variables in Z are divided into known K and unknown variables X.
Similarly, the constraints C are divided into constraints CK that only apply to
the known variables and CX that involve at least one unknown variable. An
incidence matrix S describes the structure graph where each row in the matrix
represents a constraint and each column a variable. S(i; j) = 1 means that
variable xj appears in constraint ci, S(i; j) = x denotes a directed connection.
2.6 Constraints
Constraints represent the functional relations in the system, i.e. originating in
a physical model using rst principles. The constraints needed for structural
analysis are far more simple. Instead of using the explicit system equations,
structural analysis need to know whether a certain constraint makes use of a
particular variable. Parameters that are known from the physics of the plant or
from properties of the automation system, e.g. a control gain, are treated as part
of the constraint in which the particular parameter is used. A constraint can be
directed. This implies that a variable on the left hand side of the constraint can
not be calculated from the right hand side of the constraint.
2.7 Variables
There are three dierent kinds of variables: Input variables are known, externally
dened; Measured variables are entities measured in the system; Unknown vari-
ables are internal physical variables. Input and measured variables both belong
to the set K but are separated for calculation of controllability.
2.8 Matching and results
The central idea in the structure graph approach is to match all unknown vari-
ables using available constraints and known variables, if possible. If successful,
the matching will identify over-determined subgraphs that can be used as ana-
lytical redundancy relations in the system.
Use of a complete matching on unknown variables is not a necessary prereq-
uisite to nd analytic redundancy relations. Finding minimal structural overde-
termined subgraphs within a structure graph, referred to as MSO sets, was
introduced in [64], and their very ecient MSO set algorithm makes structural
analysis feasible for real life complex systems.
Results of the structural analysis are
{ List of parity relations that exist
{ Auto-generated suggestion of residual generators
{ List of detectable behavioural faults
{ List of isolable behavioural faults
The term behavioural faults are used to emphasise that the faults determined
by the structural analysis are violation of a normal behaviour.
When a matching has been found, backtracking to known variables will give
a suggestion for parity relations that could be used as residual generators. A
system with m constraints and n parity relations will give a relation showing
which residuals depend on which constraints.
One view on these relations is the boolean mapping,
F : r  M 
 (ci 6= 0) (4)
from which structural detectability and isolability can be found.
Denition 7 (Structural detectability) A fault is structurally detectable i
it has a nonzero boolean signature in the residual,
ci 2 Cdetectable i 9j : ci 6= 0) rj 6= 0
Denition 8 (Structural isolability) A fault is structurally isolable i it has
a unique signature in the residual vector, i.e. column mi of M is independent of
all other columns in M,
ci 2 Cisolable i 8j 6= i : mi 6= mj
2.9 Active isolation
In some cases faults are group-wise isolable, i.e within the group individual faults
are detectable but not isolable. This implies that with the given architecture of
the system, these faults are group-wise not isolable. This does not necessarily im-
ply that isolation can not be achieved in other ways. Indeed, although the same
set of residuals will be "red" when either one or the other of non-structurally
isolable constraints is faulty, the time response of the residuals may be dierent
under the dierent fault cases. Exciting the system with an input signal per-
turbation may therefore make it possible to discriminate dierent responses of
the same residual set when dierent constraints within the group are faulty. The
analytical idea of applying test signals to isolate faults is not new. [101] designed
test signals for diagnosis. A sophisticated setup for active diagnosis was made in
[74] and controller switching made for active diagnosis was shown in [83]. The
structural analysis approach was rst suggested in [11] and extended to dierent
use modes in [67].
Proposition 1 Active structural isolation is possible if and only if both a struc-
tural condition and a quantitative condition are true.
Structural condition : the known variables in the set of residuals associated with
a group of non-structurally isolable constraints include at least one control input.
Quantitative condition : the transfer from control inputs to residuals and or to
output is aected dierently by faults on dierent constraints.
Denition 9 (Input to output reachability) Let p(i;j) = fcf ; cg; :::; chg be
a path through the structure graph from input ui to zj, where z is a residual
or an output and
Q(i;j)
the union of valid paths from ui to zj : Let C
(i;j)
reach =n
cg j cg 2
Q(i;j)o
: A constraint ch is input reachable from input ui if a path
exists from uj to any output (or residual) zk and the path includes the constraint,
ch 2 C(i;k)reach
Proposition 2 (Active structural isolability) Two constraints cg and ch are
actively structurally isolable from output signatures if 9i; j; k; l : cg 2 C(i;j)reach; ch 2
C
(k;l)
reach and fcg; chg =2 C(i;j)reach \ C(k;l)reach
These structural properties easily reveal which possibilities there are for ac-
tive isolation of faults in a system described by it's behaviours and associated
topology (structure). The detailed design of which test signals are feasible and
how test signals are detected eciently detected are subjects of the signal-based
design that follows the analysis based on structure.
2.10 Analysis of scenarios with multiple faults
Scenarios of multiple faults are dealt with, in the structural analysis context, by
removing one or more constraints that represent the faulty parts of the system.
Should c6 be subject to a local failure, the remaining system Sf = S n fc6g need
be re-analysed. The results can show which residual generators exist for the faulty
system, and which further faults could be isolated or detected. An application
to a marine control system was treated in [8] where analysis of multiple faults
was demonstrated as part of a fault-tolerant design.
3 Design procedure based on analysis of behavioural
relations
Having introduced the formal background of the structure-based approach, the
generic procedure for setup and design of the diagnostic system is now presented,
including a brief overview of the signal-based design steps that are needed to con-
vert the results from analysis based on structure to detection lters and change
detection algorithms. This section will outline the generic design procedure [5]
based on a system described by dynamic and algebraic constraints,
_x = g(x; z;u;d; )
0 =m(x; z;u;d; ) (5)
y = h(x; z;u;d; )
_x =
dx
dt
;
where x are states, z are variables determined by algebraic constraints, u is input,
y is measured output, d is unknown disturbances and  are system parameters.
3.1 Tools for analysis of system structure properties
Let a system be given by the set of constraints of the form 5. The basic tool for
analysis of system structure and generation of analytical redundancy relations
is the matching of the unknown variables (x; z;d) in a bipartite graph to the
known ones, (y;u) through the constraints, as outlined above.
A rst approach to matching in structural analysis was to generate a single
complete causal matching on the over-specied part of the system [89] from which
structural detectability and isolability properties could be shown. For nonlinear
systems, isolability can be enhanced by the use of combinations of residuals
for a diagnosis. Therefore, all matchings were generated in [23, 28] to investigate
isolability properties. Finding all possible matchings is computationally heavy or
even impossible for large industrial scale systems and Krysander [63], [64] instead
nds minimal structurally over-determined (MSO) subgraphs within a graph. An
MSO set is a subgraph where only one constraint can be removed to get a just-
determined part of the graph. An MSO set contains a complete matching plus
one unmatched constraint, and one redundancy relation is available from each
MSO set. The algorithm by [63] is very ecient and was found to be about
105 times faster for a nine-bus electrical power distribution system [60] than
the earlier algorithms [28]. In cases where the system topology might change,
further techniques exist to also explore the dierent modes of operation and
deduct isolability from the operation in dierent use modes [67].
3.2 Transformation to signal space and analysis
Having found the matchings or MSO sets from the structural representation,
and having listed the from the unmatched constraints to be used for diagnosis,
mapping to analytical form is obtained by backtracking of unknown variables
to known ones. Solving for unknown variables is done in the order specied by
the particular matching. Tools are available that can compute the residuals from
specication of the constraints [6], from a Simulink r simulation of a system [38]
or from a bond graph of the system, see [30] and references herein.
FDI properties from the structural analysis should be interpreted with a bit
of care, since structural and analytical properties in detectability and isolabil-
ity are not identical. The isolability relations were analysed in [66] who intro-
duced checking models to better approximate analytical isolability from struc-
tural isolability.
In summary, analytical redundancy relations (ARR) are generated from un-
matched constraints, and the residuals are the ARR functions of time. The gen-
eral form of the analytical redundancy relation obtained is the vector r(t), which
is zero or non-zero when there is no deviation from normal, the H0 condition,
or a deviation from zero, the H1 condition, respectively.
The set of constraints carr that form the ARRs obtained from structural
analysis will be linear or nonlinear, according to how the system is modelled,
carr(t) = garr(y; u; x; _x; ); (6)
where  are system parameters. Backtracking through a matching will express
the unknown variables by the known ones, hence the set of residuals, represented
by the vector r(t) will be functions only of known variables and their derivatives,
r(t) = gr(y(t);u(t); _y(t); _u(t); y(t); u(t); :::; ): (7)
Residuals for diagnosis In terms of structural analysis, r(t) will be dierent
from zero for some t if a constraint is violated. In order to analyse the detailed
properties of residual generators, we introduce faults f in an explicit way in the
system being analysed and can then deduct properties as sensitivity of residuals
to particular faults and estimation of magnitude of faults. The system is then
described by
_x = g(x; z;u;d; ; f)
0 =m(x; z;u;d; ; f) (8)
y = h(x; z;u;d; ; f)
_x =
dx
dt
;
and the associated residual vector by
r(t) = gr

y(t); _y(t); : : : ;u(t); _u(t); : : : ; f(t); _f(t); : : : ; 

: (9)
In the linear, time invariant setting, using s as the Laplace transform variable,
the residual vector can be written in the form,
r(s) = Vruu(s) +Vry(s) (Hyu(s; )u(s) +Hyd(s; )d(s) +Hyfs; f(s)) (10)
Decoupling from from input u and disturbances d are obtained as part of
the structural analysis since unknown disturbances are matched. Hence Vru and
Vry obtain the property,
0 =
 
Vry(s) Vru(s)
Hyu(s) Hyd(s)
I 0

(11)
This could also be obtained through a left nullspace design in the frequency
domain. For linear systems, the decoupling property could also be obtained by
unknown input observer design [34]. The structural analysis, the left nullspace
approach and the unknown input observer design are equivalent for stable sys-
tems. Structural analysis followed by an observer-based implementation is pre-
ferred for unstable systems.
Real life residuals should not comprise pure derivatives, for reasons of noise
amplication, and no pure integrations, for reason of bias in measurements,so
ltering is required. This is a natural part of the design that follows the basic
calculation of residuals. Linear methods have been thoroughly analysed in [97]
and references herein.
Ideal residual generators, leave the residual perfectly decoupled from input
and disturbances. The residuals are only sensitive to faults, but the decoupling
requirement can sometimes mask particular faults. When a non-masked fault
is present, the residual will change, and detection of the change makes room
for diagnosis of the fault. The logical steps include rst detection that a fault
is present, then isolation of which fault is present and then estimation of the
magnitude of the fault. Faults can be strongly detectable in residuals if the change
in residual persists as long as the fault is present, or it can be weakly detectable.
The denitions of these terms are provided in the standard literature on fault
diagnosis, including text books as [80],[42], [5] and [21].
3.3 Robust residuals
The ideal performance of residual generators Eqs. (9) and (10) is obtained as-
suming perfect knowledge of system dynamics. With uncertainty being present,
robustness need be assured. The structural analysis approach can force residual
generators to be robust to selected parameters by declaring these parameters as
unknown variables in the analysis. In this way, the parameters are treated as
completely uncertain. If robustness is desired against more generic uncertainty
bounds, not related to one or more particular parameters, principles of robust
design using Hinfty optimal design methods were thoroughly treated in [72]
and [19]. The principle is to dene residual generation as an optimisation prob-
lem, weighing sensitivity for faults against sensitivity to input and to unknown
disturbances. Robustness to variations and uncertainty in parameters  can be
obtained using Hinfty methods. The robust residual generator design has been
extended to incorporate active diagnosis techniques [74].
Another approach is to use interval methods where an observer calculates
the interval, a polygon in the output space, where output could be expected
given the bounds on the  vector. A prediction can also be made assuming the
occurrence of particular faults and associated intervals [53]. Hypothesis about
faults can be made by rejection of models that are not in conformance with
observed behaviour [16],[86], and robust active diagnosis methods have been
suggested [94].
3.4 Evaluation of residuals
In most real applications, random noise in residuals requires that stochastic
change detection is employed for their evaluation and testing of hypotheses about
presence of faults. Using the notation H0 for nominal system (no faults) and H1
for occurrence of a particular fault. Two models are distinguished based on
discrete time observation of the residual,
H0 : r(k) = w(k)
H1 : r(k) = a(k) +w(k) (12)
where a(k) is a change in the residual of known or unknown magnitude or time-
wise prole, and w(k) is a random component that can have a Gaussian or other
distribution. The increments of each component wi(k) of w(k) would ideally be
independent and from identical distributions (IID). Change detection is often
based on testing a log-likelihood ratio of the distribution of residuals p(rjH0),
assumoing H0 and p(rjH1), assumoing H1. Taken over a window of size M , the
log-likelihood
S(k) =
1
M
kX
j=k M
ln

p(r(j)jH0)
p(r(j)jH1)

: (13)
Theoretical methods to detect various change proles have been developed, see
[2] and [75] for Gaussian change detection, [58] for non-Gaussian cases and [47]
for combined signal processing and change detection, and improved formulations
are constantly evolving, see e.g. [31].
A test statistic g(k) is computed based on S(k) using cumulative sum (CUSUM)
algorithms for known changes, generalised likelihood (GLR) methods or others
to detect an unknown change. A popular detection scheme is to compare g(k)
with a threshold h and decide H1 when g(k) > h. Key features oered by change
detection theory include the possibility to predict the probability of false detec-
tion PF under H0 and the probability of detection PD under H1. Theoretical
results to determine h commonly assume IID to calculate a detection threshold
Real life residuals often are neither Gaussian nor IID so theoretic thresholds
fall short in relating practical choice of h with PF and PD. Instead, the distribu-
tion of g(k) can be estimated from data, and h is determined from the estimated
distribution. Estimating over a sliding window was pursued in [39] and [48], [99]
for dierent domains of applications.
4 Aeroplane Diagnosis and Fault Handling
A case of diagnosis and fault handling of speed sensor faults on a small Un-
manned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was rst studied in [49] and a comprehensive
solution was presented in [48]. Focusing on faults in the pitot tube, that eas-
ily causes a crash if not diagnosed and handled in time, redundant information
about aircraft velocity, residuals are easily generated that allow both isolation
and handling of a single sensor failure. Recorded telemetry data of an actual
event with a pitot tube defect illustrate the ecacy of the diagnostics.
4.1 Airspeed Sensor Problem
Defects on sensors can have catastrophic consequences for aircraft, specially
smaller UAVs, which do not have the same sensor redundancy that is available
on a larger aircraft. It is therefore important to be able to detect whether a sensor
defect has occurred. One of the vital sensors for an UAV is the pitot tube which
measures the airspeed of the vehicle. This sensor is very exposed because of its
position in the airstream and can easily be clogged by dust or water particles
that freeze at higher altitudes.
The solution to these clogging problems usually employed on larger aircrafts
is to install several pitot tubes with build in heating devices to have a redundant
system that can accommodate icing. Because of weight and space limitations,
adding more sensors is usually not an option on smaller UAVs. Therefore, a dif-
ferent approach must be taken to diagnose and accommodate faults. One way
is to have artifact readings detected and replaced with estimated values. Detec-
tion of faults and fault-tolerance for UAVs has a lot of focus and, as described
in [22], many parts of the aircraft control and operation can benet from using
fault tolerant methods. A systematic approach to fault detection is described
in [36] and some of the applications of these methods are, detection of mechan-
ical defects, like stuck control surfaces. These were studied in [4] and [77] where
active methods were used to isolate faults. Observer based fault diagnosis was
investigated in e.g. [50]. Nonlinear models that describe the aircraft can also
be used in fault diagnosis, this was demonstrated on small helicopters in [37]. A
comprehensive overview for the state of art in diagnosis in aerospace was given
in [103], and [46] and [43] covered uses in the aircraft industry.
4.2 Model for Diagnosis
Aircraft are usually modelled by the dynamic and kinematic equations, that
describe their motion through the air. For some aircraft very detailed models are
available, that includes nonlinear terms caused by aerodynamic eects. As the
equations of motion are inherently nonlinear, these models gives a very accurate
aircraft behavioral description. Several textbooks, including [91] describe the
detailed models.
A formulation of the generic behaviours for an aircraft [36], showed that
the structural analysis approach is also well suited for generating a model for
fault diagnosis. The behavioural formulation reduces the complexity to precisely
what is required for diagnosis and the details of particular nonlinearities need
be scrutinised only when needed for particular residuals. Focusing on the speed
sensor fault diagnosis, a simplied behaviour description, related only to vehicle
speed, is shown in Table 1 where vn is speed over ground (navigation frame),
vt is air speed through propeller disc if the propeller was not present, va is air
speed vector,vw, the wind velocity vector, vp pitot tube measured air speed, vg
velocity estimated by the GPS.
Table 1. Velocity Related Behaviours
constraint behaviour
c1 : vn = va + vw
c2 : v^t = g1(n; jvaj; )
c3 : v^t = jvaj
c4 : v^w = g2(vn;va)
c5 : v^w = vw
m1 : vg = vn
m2 : vp = jvaj
In Table 1, the function g1 is an estimator of air speed va using the propeller
thrust relations, where n is known rotational speed, g is gravity acceleration
constant, m i mass of the aircraft, Tnn and Tnv are parameters determined from
propeller characteristics, and FA is aerodynamic drag,
g1 = (Tnvn)
 1  
Tnnn
2   FA(va; ) mg sin()

(14)
The function g2 is an estimator that provides a fairly uncertain estimate of the
wind velocity vector.
Table 2. Graph for Aeroplane Velocity Case.
known unknown
n vg vp  v^t v^w vn va vw
c1 1 1 1
c2 -1 -1 1 -1
c3 1 -1
c4 1 -1 -1
c5 1 1
m1 1 1
m2 1 -1
The sets K and X of known and unknown variables in this problem are,
K = fn;vg; vp; g (15)
X = fv^t; v^w;vn;va;vwg
With 5 unknowns and 7 constraints, there are up to 2 unmatched constraints,
that can be used as parity relations. When solving the set of matched constraints
in Table 1, calculability need be accounted for since a vector length can be
determined from the components of the vector but not reversely. A representation
of the structure graph associated with the constraints are shown in form of the
incidence matrix in Table 2. A 1 in the matrix shows that the associated variable
can be calculated from the constraint, a  1 shows that it can not.
One complete matching on the unknown variables is achieved as follows:
c1 ! va; c4 ! v^w; c5 ! vw;m1 ! vn; c3 ! v^t; (16)
The set of unmatched constraints are fc2;m2g. Backtracking to known vari-
ables along the matching leads to a symbolic form of the residuals and insertion
of the analytical constraints from Table 1 gives the residuals,
R1 = jvg   v^wj   vp = jvg   g2(vn;va)j   vp (17)
R2 = v^t   vp = g1(n; jvpj; )  vp (18)
This result is quite intuitive but the formal procedure assures that all possible
redundancies have been explored.
Finding all minimal structurally overdetermined subsystems in a set of con-
straints is the basis of an extremely ecient algorithm developed by Krysander
et.al [64]. The result is a table similar to the backtracking shown above that is
a recipe to nd an analytic redundancy relation. This algorithm is integrated in
the latest version of SaTool, an open source software [6] that analyze detectabil-
ity and isolability, and provides symbolic and analytic expressions of residuals
from a set of constraints that express the dynamic behaviours of a system.
While the simple estimate g1 was found to suce for the purpose of fault
diagnosis by [49], more sophisticated and precise nonlinear estimators have been
suggested in the literature. [102] described a way to estimate state and param-
eters in nonlinear systems with a structure similar to the thrust equation here,
[10] applied an adaptive observer scheme and [82] showed nonlinear observer
designs for thrust estimation. Several estimation techniques were integrated in
determining air-speed sensor faults in [48] that also assessed detection and false
alarm probabilities from real data.
4.3 Signal analysis
Figure 2 shows a time history and a histogram for R1 and R2 from UAV ight
data in the fault free case.
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Fig. 2. Time development and histogram for residual R1 and R2 in the fault free case.
The power spectral densities of the residual signals are not white. Since white
noise is one of the requirements for most statistical change detectors to perform
optimally, the low-pass ltered nature of the noise should be removed. One solu-
tion of dealing with coloured noise is to lter white noise through a suitable lter
function to take into account the correlations present in the coloured noise. This
can be created from a large record of data where all the signals properties are
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Fig. 3. Power spectrum densities for residual R1 and R2.
present. As indicated on gure 3 the power spectrum density of the two residuals
consists of a part which decreases with 40 dB=decade and a part which decreases
with 80 dB=decade. A whitening lter can be implemented as any stable lter,
including as a Kalman lter.
Figure 4 shows time series of the whitened residuals and their histograms.
Neither of the residuals are now Gaussian distributed. Instead they follow the
Cauchy distribution (equation 20) very well as indicated by the green dotted line
in the histogram. The Gaussian nature that the residuals had before whitening
apparently came from the eects of low-pass ltering. When removed during the
whitening process, the Gaussianity was lost.
4.4 Change Detection
Detection of an unknown change of mean value A of a signal x should distinguish
between two hypotheses,
H0 : x[n] = w[n]
H1 : x[n] = A+ w[n] (19)
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Fig. 4. Time development and histogram for the whitened residual R1 and R2 in the
fault free case.
The variance of the noise w is 2w. The GLRT (Generalised Likelihood Ratio
Test) is a standard way to solve such a problem. The standard solution assumed
Gaussian noise. When the residuals are distributed according to a Cauchy dis-
tribution (as seen from gure 4) the following probability distribution function
must be used
p(x;xo; ) =

 (x  xo)2 + 2
(20)
where the two parameters are the half-width half-maximum scaling, , and the
oset xo. The GLRT test statistic becomes
LG(x) =
QN
i=1 p

xi; x^o; ^

QN
i=1 p

xi; 0; ^
 > c (21)
The maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of ^ and x^o is found by tting the
data to equation 20.
Detection of change according to Eq. 21 requires that the threshold  is
determined. If the distribution of LG(xjHo) is known, the probability of false
alarm is:
PF (xjH0; ) =
Z 1

pLG(xjH0)dx (22)
The probability density (pdf) and the cumulative density (cdf) for LG(H0)
are shown using ight data in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Histogram and cumulative density for the LG(H0) test statistics for the GLRT
Cauchy detector. Data and approximating function.
The approximating function to the CDF in the gure is a Gamma distribu-
tion.
G(x; a; b) =
1
ba  (a)
xa 1 exp

 x
b

x > 0 (23)
where   denotes the Gamma function. The distribution is tted with a MLE
and the following parameters are found
a b
R1 0.46 5.58
R2 0.43 4.91
Selecting a threshold of  = 50 gives a probability of false alarm of 1  
G(50; 0:46; 5:58) = 2:0 10 5 for R1.
The theoretical performance could also be calculated using formulas from
[49] but since theory and practice sometimes dier, it is advisable to check one's
threshold value using an observed CDF from the test statistics of real data.
This is particularly the case when the assumption of independent and identically
distributed (iid) samples is not valid. The threshold required to achieve a certain
false alarm probability can be very much dierent from its theoretical value [58]
when the iid assumption is not valid.
4.5 Results
To test the detection performance, data from a real event are used where a
UAV crashed, caused by a pitot tube defect and propagated eects on the ight
control. The detection results are shown together with the residuals in Figure
6.
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Fig. 6. Residuals and detector output. At approximately t = 1140 s the clogging of the
pitot tube occurs (marked with the red vertical line).
As seen an alarm is raised, indicated by a value of 1, about 14 seconds after
assumed instant when the incident started. Timely detection is hence obtained
and with yet another 120 seconds elapsing until the crash happened, there would
have been ample time to execute remedial actions had this detection system been
available.
The simple detection methods in this example are sucient to avoid simple
accidents with simple equipped UAV's. Pitot tube defects have happened also
on larger aircraft despite redundancy to a fail-operational level and the fault-
diagnosis techniques could be part of fault-tolerant solutions and have a wider
area of application.
5 Fault-tolerant Guidance using Vision
This second case from agriculture brings diagnosis and fault-tolerant control
techniques in operation within advanced computer vision based sensors. In agri-
culture, typical tasks are to follow structures in the eld to plow, seed, spray
or harvest. The specic harvesting task of baling involves to follow rows of cut
straw or grass (swath, see g. 7) in order to pick it up and process it into bales.
This is a labour intensive and repetitive task, which is of interest to automate.
The diculties pertaining to automating this task are similar to the diculties
in automating a large range of agricultural tasks. The ability to track this struc-
ture using 3D shape information from a stereo camera and/or GPS information
was demonstrated in [15] and a detailed presentation of the baling problem was
presented in [13] where a classier was employed based on online learning of tex-
ture information about the swath and the surroundings. This was then coupled
with shape information to extract the swath position and a mapping kept track
of measured swath positions. The map was used to guide the vehicle along the
swath by steering the tractor's front wheels while a driver controlled the throttle
and brakes. The novelty with respect to diagnosis in this application is the use of
diagnostic techniques to obtain fault tolerance in the stereo vision sensor itself,
avoiding typical reasons for artifacts that occur in the stereo vision process when
distance to objects are calculated. Highlights from this real-life case are given
below.
The system to be analysed is equipped with stereo-vision, a single antenna
GPS and an IMU, in one conguration. GPS positions of the vehicle that formed
the swath are known. The combination of stereo-vision and GPS allows the
system both to "see" the swath but also navigate based on the given map. This
creates system redundancy that is essential for achieving fault-tolerance. A
visual odometry algorithm on the stereo-camera allows for the relative position
of the vehicle without GPS or IMU. The GPS receiver used was ground-station
compensated and the IMU was a tactical grade (low accuracy) MEMS based
unit.
The two main ideas presented is rst a behavioural model for representing
the natural environment, namely the swath. Secondly, it is shown how parts of
this model (the swath location) can be used in conjunction with sensor inputs
to create a fault tolerant sensor fusion system. The fault diagnosis is illustrated
using real data.
Fig. 7. Swath in the eld to be collected.
5.1 Modelling the Natural Environment
A model of the swath requires extracting the salient features of the environment
required for the eld operation and storing them in the model representation.
The salient features are the location of the swath and the distribution of the
swath material across the swath. Swath location, width, and height are modelled
as a map using splines to follow the centre of the swath in a metric map. The
model is illustrated in g. 8.
The swath location is dened as being in a 2D coordinate system on the
ground plane. A function f represents the lines down the middle of the swaths.
Given coordinate pairs (x; y) then f is:
y = f(x) (24)
The model of the swath location is then s(x) with s 2 S3(k0:n), where k0:n
are the spline knots and the spline coecients and S3 is the cubic spline domain.
Then the model is equal to the swath location plus the approximation error ea
of tting a spline to f :
s(x) = f(x) + ea (25)
Based upon the concept of having a controller that allows the vehicle to
follow the swath location, the position error "x = [y0; ; C0]
T
can be found as
a function of the tractor position and the spline. Here, y0 is the lateral oset
from the control point to the spline (also known as the X-track error), angle
 is the angular dierence between the vehicle attitude and the swath, and C0
is the curvature of the swath near the vehicle. Dening the spline sb in body
coordinates a function E can be set to nd the position error:
"x = E(sb) (26)
Fig. 8. (a) RGB topdown-view of the swath with swath location illustrated with a
green spline and estimated swath width superimposed with red borders. (b) The same
swath model but with grayscale values illustrating the height of the swath in a given
cell.
5.2 Stereo-Camera
A stereo algorithm is used to nd the correspondence between features in the
left and right image sensor (il; ir). The position of the features relative to the
stereo-camera can then be inferred in 3D. Modern vision algorithms then exist
to register 3D models with the 3D point cloud provided by the stereo-camera:
[45]. An algorithm has been constructed that allows such registration between
the swath model and the 3D points. The stereo-algorithm and registration will
be denoted by the function Vreg. Thus, given the two images a measurement of
the swath location sc can be computed for the part of the swath in the image.
sc = Vreg(il; ir) (27)
These measurements are stored in a map representation for an individual
swath and sm is the spline formed by combining N previous measurements,
sm(k) = min
spline
(sc(j); j = k  N; k) (28)
5.3 Robust Stereo Enhancement by Texture
Stereo vision uses correlation of textures to determine distance to objects in
view of both cameras. When misclassication of texture happens, gross errors
may occur in the stereo calculated distance to objects or artifact objects can
occur or objects can disappear. To robustify the stereo against such artifacts,
[13] introduced statistical validation of texture using so called textons. Texture
properties can include colour distribution, intensity, shape and patterns. Tex-
tons are basis vectors extracted from the local descriptors of texture. Following
[98], who showed that small local texture neighbourhoods may be better than
using large lter banks, [14] and [13] employed statistical classication to the
problem and used the texture-based classication of swath as a supplement to
the geometrical mapping described above.
5.4 Texton Labelling
Given a colour image as input, pixel neighbourhoods in the image are grouped
into belonging to a texton type, which belongs to a set of basis textons i ob-
tained by prior learning from a training image. This is done by rst extracting
a descriptor in the form of a vector from each pixel location in the image. For
each location the pi vector is:
pi =
266666664
w1  lc
w2  ac
w2  bc
w3  (l1   lc)
...
w3  (l8   lc);
377777775
(29)
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Fig. 9. (a) Left image from the stereo camera. (b) Texton classication. Pixel colour
shows class of texton. (c) The stereo camera image with a transparency mask based
on the swath classication. (d) Swath classication based on texture with intensity
representing the strength of classication.
where [lc; ac; bc] is the colour of the pixel at this location in CIE*LAB colour-
space. (l1   lc); :::; (l8   lc) are the intensity dierences between the pixel at
this location and the 8 surrounding pixels in a 33 neighbourhood. The vector
elements are then weighted using fw1 = 0:5; w2 = 1; w3 = 0:5g. A K-means al-
gorithm is then run on all these descriptors to extract cluster centres which we
refer to as textons. The fast K-means algorithm ([57]) was used in [13] to nd
the set of textons j that partitions the descriptors into  sets T = T0; T1; :::; T
by trying to minimise:
Treg = argmin
T
X
j=1
X
pi2Tj
kpi   jk2 (30)
As a nal step, processing of all labelled pixels in an image at time k gives an
estimate of swath density using the textons that are classied as belonging to
the swath swath,
st(k) = max
density
Treg(pi 2 swath; i = k  N : : : k) (31)
Each pixel location in the image is then labelled by nding the nearest texton
in Euclidean space. An example of the result of such a classication is shown
in Fig.9.
One way of abstracting the texture processing could be in the form of a spline
function describing the texture-classied swath,
st(k) = min
spline
(st(j); j = k  N; k) (32)
Another use of the texton classication could be to robustify the stereo esti-
mate Eq. 27 by,
[sct; gct; hct]
T
= Vreg(il; ir; Treg): (33)
Using the intelligent sensor capability of Eq. 33 represents a fault-tolerant
processing within the stereo algorithms that could be used after learning of the
set swath has been obtained. This is an alternative to using Eqs. 32 and 28
separately, but the latter could have benets during unsupervised learning.
5.5 Structural Model
The constraints in this case describe the structured natural environment of the
eld with swath, the baler and the available sensors. Let the constraints be com-
posed of those from measurements (m), dierential (d), and the "system" con-
straints (c). Using vb for visual odometry measured velocity vector over ground
seen in body coordinates; ab for IMU measured acceleration vector; pn the posi-
tion in (North, East) coordinates with pn1 being the position measurement from
the GPS; Rnb is the rotation matrix from body to navigation frame, which is a
function of ; the attitude vector (Euler angles roll, pitch and yaw) and of ;
the latitude;. sb is the swath position spline seen in body coordinates. In this
analysis, the Rnb matrix is assumed to be known.
With variables dened above, the sets of known and unknown variables are,
K = fvb;ab;pn1 ; sg; sc; ; sm; st;Rnb (; )g
X = fpn; _pn; sb; s; "xg (34)
The constraints are summarised in Table 3.
Table 3. Behaviours for Baler Control Example
c1 : s
b = Rnb (; )s+ p
n
c2 : "x = E(sb)
d1 : _p
n = d
dt
pn
m1 : v
b = Rnb (; ) _p
n
m2 : a
b = d
dt
Rnb (; ) _p
n
m3 : p
n
1 = p
n
m4 : sg = s
m5 : sc = s
b
m6 : sm = s
b
m7 : st = s
b
Fig. 10. Block diagram of vision system and tracking control for baling. Supervised
classication and positioning provides mapping of eld structures, which are fed to the
steering controller.
5.6 Residuals for fault diagnosis
The number of constraints available depends on: the use mode, eg. m7 is only
available when the tractor is in the eld with a swath and texture learning has
been completed; the conguration, eg. whether an inertial measurement unit
(IMU) is mounted; on faults, eg. failure of an instrument. Structural analysis
under dierent use modes was presented in [67] and aspects of analysis under
simultaneous faults was discussed in [11]. A structural analysis of the baler exam-
ple, without the texture element, was presented in [12]. Analysing the constraints
listed in Eq. 3, the following residuals are obtained,
r1 = v
b  Rnb (; )
d
dt
pn1
r2 =
d
dt
vb   ab (35)
r3 = E(sc)  E(Rnb (; )sg + pn1 )
r4 = E(sc)  E(sm)
r5 = E(sm)  E(st)
5.7 Field Tests
The properties of residuals were investigated based on recorded data. The posi-
tion of the swath was rst logged by following the middle of the swath manually
- emulating the vehicle forming the swath. This was repeated for a second pass
emulating the vehicle that should pick up the swath. This provides some form
of limited ground truth. The position error of the driver is bounded between
the runs as he constantly steers relative to the swath.
Experience with driving with balers puts the error associated with not driv-
ing exactly over the center of the swath to under 0:2m as this is required to
pick up the swath successfully. In the data examined the GPS has a false oset
in the second pass relative to the rst pass of approximately 0:6m for the rst
approx. 70 s before it corrects its position estimate to bring it to about 0:15m
of the swath location. This oset is acceptable for normal operation. Field
tests enabled calculation of residuals r1; r3 and r4 as an instrumentation issue
prevented data reception from the IMU. The eld test is hence representing a
case of one permanent failure and an additional fault occurring.
The driver interfaces to the control system through a terminal to change
settings and engages/disengages the automatic steering system through a switch.
The baler has integrated pressure sensors which are used to measure the bale
diameter. This information is used in the controller to assure an even lling of
the bale chamber. A wheel angle sensor provides feedback about the angle of
the front wheels relative to the tractor. Hydraulics allow actuation of the front
wheels.
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Fig. 11. Detection of deviation in angle or across the swath track using a CUSUM test.
The thick line denes the threshold.
5.8 Control
Tests were conducted with a tracking control system that was made to collect
the swath if the match score was above a predened threshold. The control
system remains active as long as map information is available ahead of the
vehicle. A main diculty in baling is that the bale chamber must be lled evenly.
Pressure sensors inside the baler provide a measure of how evenly it is lled. If
the bale chamber is unevenly lled then the bale becomes cone shaped. The
bale must have a certain size before the pressure sensors give usable feedback.
To compensate for this lack of feedback the controller has two states. In the
initial state where pressure has not yet built up an open-loop steering pattern is
followed where the vehicle changes between being the left and right edges of the
swath. The steering system changes mode when the bale size reaches a threshold
and sensor feedback is used. The sensor feedback spans an interval from  1
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Fig. 12. The vehicle was driven manually over a swath. The driver centered the vehicle
over the middle of the swath and drove for 2min while maintaining this centered
position. The x-track errors from the subsystems were recorded.
to 1 indicating how cone shaped the bale is. This information and the relative
location of the swath (computed from a fused spline map) is used for control.
The swath parameters y0, , and C0 of the spline relative to the vehicle are then
fed to a generic curve tracking controller. Fault-tolerant control described in this
example focused on the complex parts, ie. the natural environment. Extension
with the baling control part would be simple.
Figure 11 shows detection of deviations in steering angle and cross-track
based on a CUSUM detection. The statistical change detection is much more
robust and has less nuisance from noise than any of the single measurements.
6 Conclusions
This chapter has introduced to generic principles of diagnosis and fault-tolerant
control based on the formal description of behaviours and services. The steps
of system analysis, residual generation and change detection were discussed and
exemplied through two large case studies. One dealt with a UAV sensor fault
diagnosis and fault-handling, another with vision-based baling for agriculture.
It was shown that the generic theoretic methods are indeed applicable to the
complexity met in a natural environment, and the chapter showed how such
generalisation was obtained in both theory and in practice.
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